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1 Introduction
Together with allocation (that is, supplying an adéquate provision of public
goods), redistribution and stabilization hâve been usually identified as the
main functions of fiscal policy (see, e.g., Musgrave and Musgrave (1980)).
The redistribution or equalization function is addressed to correct either
structural disequilibria or those provoked by a shock (i.e., any unexpected
event having a direct or indirect impact on the economy), where the concept
of redistribution is related to those of interpersonal comparisons, equity,
and économie and social cohésion. In turn, the stabilization function would
be addressed to smooth the business cycle and so counteracting undesired
fluctuations affecting the economy.
However, within the stabilization function, it is possible to distinguish
the stabilization function in itself, from the insurance function of fédéral fis
cal policy (Eichengreen (1993)). So, whereas the stabilization function wouid
try to compensate the effects that several régions might suffer following a
common (symmetric) shock, the insurance function would be relevant in the
présence of country-specific (asymmetric) shocks. Hence, the crucial diffé
rence between the stabilization and insurance functions lies in the kind of
shock to be offset : symmetric or asymmetric, respectively.
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The central budget plays a key rôle in the redistribution among ter-
ritories within a fédération (that is, a territory made up of several fédéral
states, each one formed by a certain number of local governments) (see
von Hagen (1993)). Starting from a certain structure of revenues and ex-
penditures, redistribution translates into an equalization function, since the
existence of progressive taxes and uniformly distributed régional transfers,
means that those régions (which can be extended to more than one state)
with a lower level of income will receive transfers from the rest. But the
central budget may also provide a stabilizing effect in an automatic way,
through direct transfers and progressive taxes. So, in the case of ail régions
simultaneously experiencing a recession, tax revenues would decrease, and
transfers would increase; this would be the stabilization function. However,
when a région suffers a recession not affecting the others, net transfers of
the central government to that région would increase; this would be the
insurance function.
On the other hand, in the context of the Economie and Monetary
Union (EMU) started by 11 member countries of the European Union (EU)
in January lst 1999, the management of fiscal policy becomes an issue of
spécial relevance. The formation of a monetary union means that both the
exchange rate vis-à-vis the other members of the union, and national mo
netary policies, disappear as independent policy instruments available to
the authorities of the member countries of the union, which now share a
common monetary policy. However, a common monetary policy cannot be
the right answer faced to the occurrence of an asymmetric shock. As al-
ready stressed in Mundell's (1961) pioneering contribution to the theory of
optimum currency areas, a common monetary policy cannot be différent for
différent régions; and, if it responds to any asymmetric shock affecting to
a particular région, the common monetary policy will necessarily hurt the
other régions. Ail this calls for some other policy instrument to cope with
asymmetric shocks. In this sensé, the possibility of introducing a centralized
fiscal policy instrument at the EU level, acting as an automatic mechanism
to offset the asymmetric shocks eventually affecting to the countries or ré
gions belonging to EMU, has been widely discussed in last years.
The analysis of such a mechanism will be the objective of this paper.
In section 2, we will discuss the main questions raised in the literature on
the degree of insurance provided by particular insurance mechanisms. In
section 3, we will review the available évidence on the degree of insurance
provided by the fédéral budget in actual fiscal fédérations. In section 4. we
will offer a spécifie proposai of an automatic insurance mechanism designed
to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. Finally, the main
conclusions are presented in section 5.Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Diaz-Roldân 75
2 The Insurance Function of Fiscal Policy :
Theoretical Issues
The proposai of providing some insurance to the régions experiencing asym-
metric shocks in a monetary union, has a certain tradition within the clas-
sical literature on optimum currency areas (Kenen (1969)), although it has
corne back to the foreground with the publication of the paper of Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs (1992).
First of ail, if we assume as désirable an automatic insurance me-
chanism against shocks, the relevant concept of shock should be defined :
asymmetric shocks, Le., those requiring an optimal answer which is diffé
rent in every country. In turn, two types of asymmetric shocks should be
distinguished : spécifie, which affect just one country (i.e., asymmetric both
in origin and in impact), and common to several countries but having a dif
férent impact on them (i.e., symmetric in origin but asymmetric in impact).
As is well known, joining EMU means the loss of the exchange rate
and an independent monetary policy as instruments available to face any
shock that might appear. However, the high degree of price and wage flexi-
bility, as well as labour mobility, required to stand as alternative adjustment
mechanisms, should not be expected to work in EMU, at least in the short
run. This is particularly important if we assume that any country or région
belonging to EMU can expérience asymmetric shocks at any time, since a
common monetary policy is not an appropriate instrument to face asymme
tric shocks. And even a common monetary policy can lead to différent effects
on différent countries or régions, depending on their initial conditions, and
so becoming a source of asymmetries. Therefore, fiscal policy appears as a
potential candidate to become the most important policy instrument to face
asymmetric shocks.
In theory, under a fédéral fiscal authority most exogenous shocks affec-
ting a monetary union would be automatically absorbed due to the effect of
procyclical taxes and countercyclical expenditures. However, faced to EMU,
the EU budget should not be expected to play the same rôle than, for ins
tance, the US fédéral budget. In fact, proposing structural reforms of the
budget would require several institutional changes, such as reinforcing the
rôle of the European Parliament, creating either a supranational authority
on taxes or funds guaranteed by différent budget rules, or establishing a
joint décision mechanism for the coordination of fiscal policies.
Incorporating the insurance function to the EU budget would mean to
reinforce fiscal competencies at the EU level, given that the size of its budget
is still relatively small. However, the implementation of a European fiscal
policy in this way would face a difficulty, since there are no fédéral taxes
at the EU level, and shifting some taxes to the EU is not envisaged. Since
the current structure of revenues and expenditures is not able to provide
an automatic stabilization, the need of designing a spécifie mechanism has
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and Smith (1993), has been discussed in several studies trying to answer
the question of how a stabilization policy at the European level might be
designed and how the insurance function might be guaranteed. In the rest of
this section we will review the main points raised in this literature, such as
the degree of automaticity of the mechanism, the proper level of government
involved, the equilibrium between redistribution and stabilization, and the
origin and destination of the funds.
2.1 Automaticity vs. discretionality
Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) défend the existence of an insurance me
chanism at the fédéral level, although they warn about the limited value of
the US expérience. Majocchi and Rey (1993) coïncide with thèse authors
in that resorting to transfers among governments would require a reform
of the European fiscal System. Since this solution seems to be hardly fea-
sible, they insist in that the alternative mechanism should operate in a
discretional way, in order to be able to verify that the shock was exogenous
and so avoiding problems of moral hazard. Italianer and Vanheukelen solve
this question by proposing a limited stabilization mechanism which could
be activated either automatically or discretionally, in the latter case if the
government of the affected country must prove that the shock escapes to
its control; this possibility takes advantage of fiscal autonomy, avoids moral
hazard and guarantees the insurance's automaticity.
2.2 National insurance vs. fédéral insurance
The basic question is not whether the fédéral budget is able to provide
insurance (see the empirical évidence reviewed in the next section), but
rather if the implementation of the insurance function should be done at
the fédéral level. According to Mélitz and Vori (1993), the insurance function
could help to overcome the loss of national independence in the management
of macroeconomic policy, and should be instrumented at the national level.
Indeed, they affirm that common shocks with asymmetric effects would not
be a problem in Europe, so that the EU would be close to be an optimum
currency area that would not require an insurance mechanism. However, the
insurance function of fiscal policy at the fédéral level would be addressed
to spécifie shocks affecting the domestic economy (Eichengreen (1993)). On
the other hand, the objective of insurance is to cover oneself against a risk,
and not necessarily to compensate the loss of independence regarding fiscal
policy.
In a récent paper, Forni and Reichlin (2001) argue that a European-
wide insurance mechanism would be more effective than a national one.
The reason is simply that the former can potentially insurance both nation-
specific and region-specific shocks. unlike the latter. which can only offsetOscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Dfaz-Roldân 77
régional shocks. Since, according to their empirical results, national shocks
account for a significant part of output fluctuations in the EMU area, the
scope for a fiscal fédération as an insurance mechanism would not be negli-
gible.
2.3 Redistribution vs. stabilization
Finding the equilibriura between redistribution and stabilization means a
problem of political décision that also affect the features of the stabilizatkm
mechanism; indeed, not ail the available studies clarify the basic différence
between both functions. Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) design a mecha
nism exclusively intended to accomplish the stabilization function, whereas
von Hagen and Hammond (1998) propose a séries of redistributive or stabi-
lizing mechanisms according to différent properties included in their design,
concluding that, the higher the econometric complexity, the higher the de
gree of stabilization provided.
2.4 Financing and destination of the funds
Both the financing of the mechanism and the destination of the funds are
open questions, since the available studies limit themselves to point to cer
tain gênerai aspects on the design of the mechanism (what to insure?,
whom ?, désirable properties, indicators to use), as well as to simulate how
some examples could work. Only Majocchi and Rey (1993) propose that
their discretional mechanism would be financed in an ad hoc manner by the
countries concerned, and that the amounts to be paid would be conditioned
in order to assure its consistency with the Community's objectives. The rest
of studies do not examine this issue, although they recognize that the degree
of stabilization attained will dépend, in part, on how the funds are used.
3 The Insurance Function of Fiscal Policy : Empirical
Evidence
Several empirical studies hâve tried to quantify, from the expérience of the
actual fiscal fédérations, the degree of insurance that the fédéral budget can
provide; however, not ail of them make clear the différence between stabili
zation and redistribution, and most of them confuse the insurance and the
stabilization functions. Ail thèse papers start from the same hypothesis :
fédéral Systems provide an insurance against shocks; next, they take as in-
dicator of the occurrence of a shock the unfavourable évolution of a certain
économie variable, and study the stabilizing properties of fiscal variables.
The insurance effect is quantified by means of two alternative methods : (i)78 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
régression analysis, distinguishing between income before and after taxes;
and (ii) simulations from macroeconomic models, making some assumptions
on the properties of the fiscal System and the degree of économie intégration.
In the rest of this section we will provide a brief review of this literature; a
more detailed account can be found in Bajo-Rubio and Diaz-Roldân (2001).
In gênerai, the studies using régression analysis compute the contri
bution of fiscal variables (taxes and transfers) on a variable that proxies the
current state of the economy (state income or product). The pioneering con
tribution hère is that of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), who regress fédéral
government's tax revenues and transfers on the final disposable income of
9 US régions for the period 1970-1988, with the variables measured in le-
vels. From the estimated elasticities in both régressions, they obtain that
the fédéral budget would absorb, through taxes and transfers, around 40%
of the initial effect of a shock. However, thèse results were critieized on the
grounds that, since variables were measured in levels, the authors were not
able to distinguish between the insurance and redistribution functions.
In this way, when the variables in the régression are measured in first
différences, von Hagen (1992) obtains, for the 51 states of the US and the
period 1981-1986, an insurance effect of 10%. In turn, Goodhart and Smith
(1993) obtain an effect of 11% when replying von Hagen's exercise for the
US but excluding the major oil-producer states; thèse authors also analyze
the cases of Canada for the period 1965-1988, and the UK for the period
1983-1987, and find an insurance effect between 12 and 17%, and 21%,
respectively. Finally, Bayoumi and Masson (1995) use variables in levels
and in first différences (which allows them to quantify the effect of the
redistribution and insurance functions, respectively) for 48 states of the US
between 1969 and 1986, and for 10 Canadian provinces between 1965 and
1988, obtaining a degree of insurance of 30% in the US case and 17% in the
Canadian case.
The second group of studies address the issue by means of simulations
from macroeconomic models, rather than régression analysis. Pisani-Ferry,
Italianer and Lescure (1993) try to measure the scope of the automatic
stabilization (insurance) provided by the fiscal System, following the appea-
rance of a shock. They obtain an effect of 17% in the US, 37% in France, and
between 34 and 42% in Germany, depending on whether transfers among
régions are included; from hère, the authors conclude that EMU member
states would not need a spécifie insurance mechanism. Goodhart and Smith
(1993) also perforai a simulation analysis, obtaining an effect of 34% for the
case of the UK, and conclude that an adéquate fiscal policy coordination
would be enough in order to insurance the différent économies against the
occurrence of shocks.
As can be seen, there are strong discrepancies in the results obtained
in the studies quoted above, which are summarized in Table 1. Thèse discre
pancies would be related to two aspects : the components of the stabilizing
mechanism, and the magnitude of its effects.Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Dîaz-Roldân 79


















































Source : Bajo-Rubio and Diaz-Roldân (2001).
Regarding the composition of the mechanism, according to Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs, von Hagen, and Goodhart and Smith, the tax System
provides the bulk of the stabilization; whereas Pisani-Ferry et al. stress the
rôle of social security payments (neglected by von Hagen) and the unemploy
ment benefit at the fédéral level, which does not exist in the US economy.
In turn, Bayoumi and Masson go a step beyond and suggest that the ap-
proaches of both Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and von Hagen, overestimate the
stabilizing effect of the tax System, since transfers would be the component
with a greater rôle in stabilization.
Turning to the quantitative différences in results, in régression ana
lyses thèse could be explained for two reasons : the sample period (the longer
the period, better results) and the variables chosen. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs,
and Bayoumi and Masson, use per capita income before taxes, whereas von
Hagen, and Goodhart and Smith, use the gross state product, a wider mea-
sure of économie activity. Regarding the fiscal variable, ail thèse studies
consider basically taxes and transfers, excluding the unemployment benefit,
which is not managed at the fédéral level; indeed, von Hagen also excludes
social security, since he argues that it can redistribute income among régions
along time. Maybe for this reason, as well as using a différent functional form
than Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, von Hagen's results were the most pessimistic
ofall.
As a preliminary conclusion, it couid be said that, although fédé
ral Systems can certainly provide insurance, the degree of fiscal federalism
actually needed can be lower than previously thought. Sala-i-Martin and80 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
Sachs' results show an upward bias, since they overlap the redistribution
and stabilization fonctions. This would be confirmed by von Hagen's wea-
ker results, even though concluding from hère that a monetary union can
work without any insurance seems to be somewhat extrême. By reconside-
ring the results of both Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and von Hagen, Goodhart
and Smith suggest that fiscal federalism can provide a remarkable degree
of insurance. However, since this resuit would hâve been obtained thanks
to several budget items non transférable to the EU budget in the médium
run, it might be inferred that, faced to EMU, the implementation of other
mechanisms would be more advisable. On the other hand, Pisani-Ferry et
al. show how the degree of stabilization provided by the US fédéral budget
would be lower than for several European countries such as Germany and
France, due to the fact that in the US there is no unemployment benefit
at the fédéral level. This would favour keeping relatively independent fiscal
policies in the EU, without being necessary either any budget reform or
creating automatic mechanisms to implement the insurance function.
4 An Insurance Mechanism against Asymétrie
Shocks in EMU
We hâve reviewed in the previous sections a number of studies that ana-
lyze, from a theoretical point of view, différent mechanisms addressed to
implement the insurance function in EMU ; as well as the available empiri-
cal évidence on such mechanisms from the expérience of the actual fiscal
fédérations. In practice, the degree of coverage provided is an empirical
question that would dépend, in principle, on the characteristics of the me
chanism. However, to the technical problems of design and implementation,
we should add the political problem of its gênerai acceptance.
4.1 The main characteristics of the mechanism
Aside the légal bases underlying the correct working of the mechanism, the
more relevant questions concerning its design would be the following.
4.1.1 Why an automatic mechanism ?
Despite the increasing degree of intégration among the European countries,
the possibility that any country or région belonging to EMU might expé
rience asymmetric shocks should not to be neglected. And, given the less
than perfect working of market mechanisms (such as price and wage flexibi-
lity, and labour mobility), and the inadequacy of a common monetary policy
to face asymmetric shocks, fiscal policy émerges as the natural candidate to
cope with asymmetric shocks in EMU. Also, given the limits imposed to theOscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Diaz-Roldan . 81
use of fiscal policy by the Pact for Stability and Growth, and the available
empirical évidence on the insurance rôle played by fédéral budgets in actual
fiscal fédérations, an automatic mechanism would seem to be more feasible
than a discretional device.
4.1.2 When should it work ?
When the indicator of the occurrence of a shock is activated. Before defi-
ning such an indicator, its désirable properties should be stressed : it must
be a rneasure both reliable and quickly available, and its fluctuations must
provide some information on the cyclical behaviour of real output. In prin-
ciple, we can choose the négative évolution of a cyclical indicator (output
or employment level, rate of growth of the economy), relative to the EU
average. As in Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993), we will use the change in
the unemployment rate, under the assumption that changes in that varia
ble correspond with changes in the opposite sensé in the economy's rate of
growth. However, unlike thèse authors, we take ail countries experiencing
an increase in unemployment as eligible to receive funds from the insurance
mechanism, provided that unemployment decreases in at least one country,
irrespective of whether this increase was above or below EMU's average.
This implies that those countries where unemployment is increasing but be
low EMU's average, are taken as being affected by a négative, not positive,
asymmetric shock; which could be justified since thèse countries would be
reluctant to be net contributors to the mechanism despite the fact that their
unemployment rates had increased.
On the other hand, the choice of the unemployment rate can be jus
tified on the grounds that it becomes available relatively easily and with a
short time lag, both at the national and régional level; and is also availa
ble (unlike output measures) at a monthly frequency. more appropriate to
reveal the appearance of a shock than, e.g., quarterly or annual frequen-
cies. It is true, however, that the évolution of the rate of unemployment
also reflects changes in the rate of activity, which is not directly related to
the effect of a shock. Despite this disadvantage, given data availability. the
unemployment rate seems to be the best candidate to become the indicator
of the occurrence of a shock1.
Finally, in order to eliminate any structural component, the unem
ployment rate should be measured as the déviation from its long-run trend.
An anonymous référée suggested to us the use of employment, rather Ihan unemployment, as the best
indicator of the occurrence of a shock. Even though we agrée with this opinion, we hâve not been able
to find homogenous employment data for the EMU countries at a monthly frequency when performing our
empirical example (see below). For this reason, we propose the rate of unemployment as the best indicator,
unless homogenous employment data might become available in the future.82 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
4.1.3 How should it work ?
Compensating in relative terms to those régions negatively affected by a
shock. Following von Hagen and Hammond (1998), the désirable properties
of an insurance mechanism would be : (i) it must operate with simplicity,
both regarding its financing and the transfer of funds; (ii) in an automatic
way. avoiding bureaucratie intervention to assure its correct working, and
with expenditures having a spécifie purpose; (iii) it must not lead to any
redistribution in the long run, so that the mechanism must be designed to
face asymmetric shocks; (iv) it must avoid moral hazard, so that observa
ble data should be used when defining the indicator of the occurrence of
a shock, and transfers should be performed among governments (in order
to avoid creating personal incentives) ; (v) it must hâve a wide coverage and
assure budget neutrality, so that those régions not affected by the unfavou-
rable shock must contribute relatively more, and only the régions affected
must receive transfers; finally, (vi) the whole amount collected must be fully
distributed, avoiding déficits or superavits in the mechanism.
4.1.4 How to finance it ?
This is a fundamental question for the gênerai acceptance of the mechanism.
since the concerned countries will be reluctant to give up any competencies
meaning a loss of political sovereignty or national autonomy. Given that
developing a fédéral budget does not seem to be viable in the short or
médium run, we will propose giving up a percentage of tax collections. In
this way. those countries not suffering the unfavourable shock will contribute
relatively more than those affected (since, when output decreases, so will do
tax receipts).
4.1.5 Who should be the beneficiary?
There is a discussion in the literature about whether the beneficiary should
be governments. or rather the individuals. Under the proposed mechanism,
the ultimate beneficiary would be the individuals becoming unemployed
every period under analysis (i.e., every month). That is, each country af
fected would receive from the fédéral authority a proportion over the total
amount collected, according to the change in its unemployment rate, which
the government of that country (or, alternatively, other lower levels of go-
vernment) should ultimately distribute among those becoming unemployed
during that month. In this way, automaticity would be warranted since reve
nues would hâve the spécifie purpose of subsidizing unemployment. Indeed,
on insuring individuals and not governments, the problems arising when
an asymmetric shock would affect to a région belonging to more than one
country would be minimi2ed (von Hagen (1993)).Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Diaz-Roldân 83
4.1.6 Which will be the degree of insurance achieved ?
This is an empirical question that would dépend basically (i) on the concept
of shock considered and on how its effects were measured; (ii) on the relative
change in the indicator and its relation with the effects of the shock; and (iii)
on the amount of the transfers received. and the way governments distribute
them among individuals.
It should be stressed hère that the proposed mechanism is designed to
address strictly the insurance function, by transferring every period some
income from countries where unemployment has decreased to those where
unemployment has increased, independently of the initial level of unem
ployment in both types of countries. In other words, it is designed to offset
an increase in unemployment (provided that unemployment has simulta-
neously decreased in at least another country), rather than high levels of
unemployment; that is, the mechanism is not designed to correct unemploy
ment, which should be addressed by other policy instruments, but to correct
the effects of (asymmetric) shocks. This can lead, as in the example below,
to the apparent paradox that the country with the highest rate of unem
ployment (Spain) would be a net contributor, at the same time that the
country with the lowest rate of unemployment (Luxembourg) would be a
net récipient.
4.2 A proposai of an insurance mechanism for EMU
Now we will présent a proposai of a spécifie and simple insurance mecha
nism against asymmetric shocks, designed to be applied to the countries
participating in EMU. As indicator of the occurrence of a shock, we will use
the change in the unemployment rate with respect to the period before :
duiim) = m(m) - Ui(m — 12)
where «j(m) is the unemployment rate of country i (i = 1,..., N: being N
the number of countries participating in EMU) in month m (m = 1,..., 12),
measured as its déviation from trend. Since in the numerical application
we will use monthly data, the unemployment rate would be the best choice
(despite the problems mentioned above) for the indicator of the shock, given
the unavailability of monthly data for other possible candidates, such as
GDP or employment. On the other hand, our indicator will refer to the
change in the unemployment rate with respect to the same month of the
year before. in order to eliminate the effect of seasonal factors.
The condition for a country h to receive payments will be :
) > 0
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where subscripts h and k dénote the country negatively affected by the
asymmetric shock, and that positively affected, respectively. In words, in
month m, country h's unemployment rate must liave increased compared to
the same month of the year before, and at least one of the other countries
must hâve registered a decrease in its unemployment rate during the same
period.
It is important to stress that, if the unemployment rate would hâve in
creased in ail the EMU countries simultaneously, the above condition would
not be fulfilled, and no country would be eligible to receive funds from
the mechanism. In other words, the unfavourable shock would hâve been
symmetric rather than asymmetric, hence requiring stabilization instead of
insurance.
As for the financing of the mechanism, we will assume that each coun
try will give up a percentage of its tax collections. Since the latter are procy-
clical, those countries not suffering the unfavourable shock would contribute
proportionally more than those affected. Denoting (that percentage (which
will be assumed to be the same for ail countries) and T* (m) the total amount
collected in country i (i = 1,...,N) in month m, (Ti(m) will be the amount
with which country i contributes every month m. In this way, the total
amount of the fund to be distributed every month m will be given by :
N
1=1
Finally, the total fund F (m) will be distributed among the coun
tries concerned according to the proportion in which every country h {h =
1,..., H) was affected by the unfavourable shock, denoted by /3/i(m) :
where fîh represents the weight of the unemployment rate of country h in the
unemployment rate in the whole EMU area (in the numerical application
the weighting factor will be GDP), being H the number of countries affected
by the unfavourable shock (0 < H < N). We will also impose the constraint
X)£Li/^(m) = 1' which guarantees that the fund is fully distributed, so
that we will eliminate the possibility of redistributive actions in the long
run.
ïherefore, each country h negatively affected by an asymmetric shock
would receive every month m a total amount Bh(m) :Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Diaz-Roldân 85
As can be seen in the previous expression, each country h negatively
afFected by an asymmetric shock would receive a higher amount the higher
was /3/i(m), which would occur, on the one hand, the higher was the relative
increase in its unemployment rate as compared to the other countries afFec
ted; and, on the other hand, the lower was the number of countries suffering
that unfavourable shock. In other words, the proposed mechanism "stabi-
lizes more" the more asymmetric was the shock, so that it would exclusively
perform the insurance function.
4.3 The insurance mechanism in practice :
an application to EMU
Next, we will présent a simple empirical application of the insurance mecha
nism proposed in the previous subsection. To this end, we will use monthly
data for the 11 countries participating in EMU frorn its inception, and the
référence year will be 19972.









































































































































































Source : Eurostat : Eurostatistics 05/1997 and 05/1998; and European Economy 66/1998.
The changes in the unemployment rate in every month of 1997 with
respect to the same month of 1996, for each one of the 11 countries and the
whole EMU area, are shown in Table 2. As can be seen, the only countries
satisfying the requirements to benefit from the proposed mechanism (i.e.,
those experiencing an increase in their unemployment rates, provided that
unemployment decreases in at least one country) would be Germany and
Luxembourg, both of them during ail the year; France, from January to
2 The figures for Greece (which joined EMU in 2000) were not available in our data set of référence. Notice
also that, in this empirical application, we use unemployment rates as they appear in our data set, given the
lack of appropriate time séries to corn pute déviations from trend.86 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
July;Italy, from January to July, and from September to November ; and
Austria, in January and February, and from April to December.
The total amount of the fund to be distributed, computed from a
percentage a given up by each country on its tax collections, is shown, for
différent values of a, in Table 3. When Computing the fund, value added tax
(VAT) collections in 1997 hâve been used. The choice of VAT might be justi-
fied on the grounds that this tax is subject to some harmonization principles
within the EU; in fact. the quantitatively most important revenue source of
the EU budget is given by the transfer of a percentage of VAT collections
in each member state. Notice that, given the lack of homogeneous data on
monthly VAT collections, we hâve assumed for simplicity that the amount
collected every year is assigned in the same proportion every month3.




































































Source : Own élaboration from OECD : Main Economie Indicators.
Next, in Table 4 we show the proportions in which those countries
satisfying the above requirements would receive payraents from the insu-
rance mechanism, where ail the /3's in each file add to one. As can be seen,
thèse proportions would be higher, cœteris paribus, the higher the relative
increase in the unemployment rate and the lower the number of countries
concerned (or, in other words, the more asymmetric the shock). Also, given
a same increase in the unemployment rate, those countries of a greater size
would receive a higher share of the total fund; in our case, those countries
with a higher GDP, since this has been the weighting factor used when
Computing the proportions /?.
3 The différent figures every month appearing in Table 3 are due to exchange rate fluctuations, since the
original figures were given in US dollars.Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Diaz-Roldân 87















































































Source : Own élaboration from Table 2, and OECD : National Accounts. Main Aggregates
1960-1997, vol. 1, 1999.
Once we know the total amount of the fund and how it will be distri-
buted among the countries suffering the unfavourable shock, in Table 5 we
présent the monthly amounts to be received by each of thèse countries, for
différent values of a.
Table 5 : Monthly amounts to be received by each country, for différent
values of a (in million Euro)
























































Finally, we hâve tried to measure the degree of coverage that the
proposed insurance mechanism would provide. Notice that we do not in


















































































































mechanism, but rather a rough approximation through a very simple pro
cédure. To this end, we hâve estimated, with annual data for the EMU-11
area during the period 1960-1996, the following équation représentative of
the so-called "Okun's Law" :
du{t) = 7 - arg(t)
where du and g dénote, respectively, the change in the unemployment rate
and the rate of growth of real GDP, and t dénotes a particular year.
Prom the estimation of the above équation, the rate of growth of
any particular country (omitting country subscripts for simplicity) in theOscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Dfaz-Roldân 89



















































































































présence of a shock (Le., when du{t) 7^ 0) would be given by :
9s(t) = - - -du(t)
and the associated GDP level by :
where Y dénotes GDP and superscript s means 'shock'. On the other hand,
in the absence of a shock (Le., when du(t) = 0), the estimated rate of growth90 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
would be given by :
and the associated GDP level by :
Yns(t) = [l+gns{t)]Y(t-l)
where superscript ns means 'no shock'.
Therefore, the size of any shock on a particular country occurred in
year t, could be proxied by :
Yns(t) - Ys(t) = [gns(t) - gs(t)] Y(t - 1)




above, can be written as :
Yns(t) - Ys(t) = \—du(t)] Y(t - 1)
In this way, the degree of coverage of the insurance for country h in
year t, would be given by the ratio of the sum of the payments received
throughout the year to the size of the shock :
Bh{t)
where




The estimation of the Okun's Law équation for the EMU-11 area
during the period 1960-1996, gave the following results (t-statistics in pa
renthèses) :
du(t) = 1.712 - 0.296g{t)
(6.834)(-7.563)Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Dîaz-Roldân 91
with R2 = 0.65, and DW = 1.76; the estimated équation also included a
time trend, with a négative and significant coefficient. In particular, the
estimated coefficient for cr, 0.296, proved to be significant at the 1% level.
The results of applying the procédure sketched above appear in Ta
ble 6. The degree of coverage has been computed as the ratio of the total
payments received from the mechanism throughout the year (i.e.. the last
Une in tables 5A through 5E), to the size of the shock, the latter measured
from the estimated coefficient for cr, the average increase in unemployment
rates computed from Table 2, and the previous year's GDP of the countries
involved.
Table 6 : Annual coverage provided by the insurance mechanism,
























Source : Own élaboration from tables 2 and 5, and Eurostat : European Economy 6/1998.
As can be seen, the resuits in Table 6 lead to values for the degree
of coverage of our insurance mechanism between 7 and 13% of the size of
the shock, depending on the value of a. Notice that the higher degree of
coverage enjoyed by France (and. to a lower extent, Italy) would be related
to the shorter (7 months) but relatively strong unfavourable shock she had
experienced; in other words, coverage would be higher the more asymmetric
the shock. In gênerai, the results obtained would be in Une with those found
in the empirical literature using régression methods (with the exception of
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs), summarized in Table 1.
To conclude, notice that we hâve presented above the simplest version
of an insurance mechanism. A possible extension, especially designed to
try to avoid moral hazard problems (see below), would be to introduce a
temporal limit to the réception of funds. For instance, we could assume that,
for any country h receiving funds from the insurance mechanism during
a certain number of months, there is a "threshold" so that this country
receives next month just a percentage xh (0 < xh < 1) of 0h; a percentage
which would decrease every month until reaching eventually the value zéro.
In this way, the corrected /3 for country h in month m, /3£(rrc), would be :
Pch(m) = ph(m)xh{m) < 0h(m)
and, since the /3's must add up to one, those countries satisfying the requi-
rements to receive funds from the insurance mechanism but not reaching
yet the "threshold", would receive a higher /3. That is, if the number of
"punished" countries is Q (0 ^ Q < H), the corrected /? for any country j92 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
not reaching the "threshold" in month m, /3?(m), would be :
PUm) = 0j(m) (^|*|| > 0j(m)
5 Conclusions
In this paper we hâve proposed an automatic insurance mechanism designed
to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. The mechanism would
use as indicator of the occurrence of a shock the changes in the unemploy-
ment rate of the countries belonging to the union, and would be financed
through a fund built from contributions of thèse countries as a percentage
of their tax receipts. The fund would be distributed among the countries af-
fected by a négative asymmetric shock according to the proportion in which
every one of them would hâve been affected by the shock.
Our proposai was illustrated by means of an empirical application to
the case of EMU. As this example shows, the insurance mechanism proposed
would lead to a higher stabilizing effect the more asymmetric was the shock
(i.e., the higher would hâve been the relative increase in the unemployment
rate and the lower the number of countries affected). Also, the total amount
of the fund would be distributed (which would eliminate the possibility of
redistributive effects in the long run), and ail the participating countries
(whether affected or not by the unfavourable shock) would contribute to
the mechanism. Finally, we presented a rough estimation of the degree of
coverage provided by the insurance mechanism, which would be in line with
the figures previously found in the literature for the actual fiscal fédérations.
Some remarkable features of the insurance mechanism proposed in
this paper are worthwhile to be stressed :
• First, since countries benefiting from the mechanism would be those ex-
periencing increases in their unemployment rates when at least one of the
other countries expériences a decrease in its unemployment rate (i.e., in
the case of an asymmetric shock), the insurance function would be pro-
perly addressed. On the other hand, if the unemployment rate would hâve
increased in ail countries simultaneously (i.e., in the case of a symmetric
shock), no country would be eligible to receive funds from the mechanism,
and the adjustment to the shock should be made through the stabiliza-
tion function; and the working of the mechanism would be independent
of the initial level of unemployment, which should be rather addressed
by the equalization or redistribution function. In this way, no confusion
with either the redistribution or the stabilization function of fiscal policy
would appear, unlike previous studies on the subject.Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Dfaz-Roldén __ 93
• Second, our mechanism wov'd be addressed to face asymmetric shocks.
But this does not mean we are assuming that asymmetric shocks would
necessarily prevail in EMU. In fact, this is an entirely empirical issue on
which there is not concluding évidence in the literature, and even some
authors hâve noticed that the greater intégration associated with EMU
would reinforce the symmetry of shocks affecting member countries (Fran-
kel and Rosé (1997)). Récent empirical work by Forni and Reichlin (2001)
shows, however, that, although European-wide shocks would explain the
bulk of output variance in EMU countries during the period 1980-1993
(around 50%), the rôle of both national and régional shocks would not
be negligible, since they would explain the other 50%. In addition, a new
source of asymmetric shocks is likely to appear in EMU, such as the asym
metric effects of the common monetary policy. Hence, asymmetric shocks
are likely to appear in any circumstance, and an automatic insurance me
chanism might be a helpful tool, specially following the disappearance
of national monetary policy and the exchange rate as policy instruments
available to the EMU countries' authorities.
• Third, it is obvious that the kind of mechanism proposed in this paper
raises the problem of moral hazard, although a way to mitigate this issue
has been sketched above, by introducing a temporal limit to the réception
of funds. However, the need for an insurance mechanism against shocks
has been widely discussed given the potential lack of suitable policy ins
truments against shocks following the formation of EMU, together with
the limitations to the use of national fiscal policies imposed in the Pact
for Stability and Growth. Is it really moral hazard more important hère
than for any other économie policy instrument ?
Notice, first, that the main objective of the Pact for Stability and Growth
is to prevent the risks of default and bailout in EMU, due to the potential
indiscipline of national fiscal policies (Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998)).
This would imply that the provisions of the Pact would be a first con-
trol on the governments fiscal stance, which would work in order to relax
moral hazard issues. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view,
Persson and Tabellini (1996) show that centralization of functions and
power from the local to the fédéral level can be welfare improving un-
der appropriate institutions, because it can offset the distortions in local
government décisions created by moral hazard. And finally, from a more
practical perspective, since the degree of coverage provided by the insu
rance mechanism should be designed to be relatively modest, this should
contribute to additionally minimize moral hazard issues; in other words,
the insurance mechanism should be designed as a help to those countries
experiencing asymmetric shocks, rather than as a fully offsetting device.
Hence, the previous arguments should contribute, in our view, to mitigate
to a great extent the problem of moral hazard associated to an EMU-wide
automatic insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks.
• Finally, it should be noticed that, even though recognizing the usefulness
of the insurance function, some authors (e.g., Mélitz and Vori (1993)) hâve94 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(1), 2003
proposed that this should be performed at the national states ' level^ rather
than to the EMU-wide level. However, as argiied by Forni and Reichlin
(2001), given the non-negligible extent of national shocks affecting the
EMU area (i.e., shocks that would be symmetric from a member country
point of view, but asymmetric from EMU's perspective), a European-
wide insurance mechanism would be more advisable than a national one.
This resuit would mean an important argument to support an insurance
mechanism performed at the EMU-wide level.
Summarizing, the mechanism proposed in this paper is intended to
be a quite simple device, providing a significant coverage to those countries
experiencing unfavourable asymmetric shocks in a monetary union, which
could be used as starting point of a more elaborated policy instrument.
On the other hand, we should recall that the practical implementation of
a mechanism of this kind is subject to the political problem of its gênerai
acceptance. In this sensé, we find quite useful hère Goodhart's argument
that, once EMU is under way, "politicians and commentators will, rightly
or wrongly, blâme the severity of cyclical downturns on monetary union"
(Goodhart (1995), p. 470). In this way, the availability of an EMU-level ba-
sed automatic insurance mechanism could help to sustain political support
for EMU in temporarily disadvantaged countries.
To conclude, notice that, in order to guarantee a better performance
for an insurance mechanism such as the one proposed in this paper, it would
be désirable to hâve better and homogeneous data on the différent variables
playing a rôle in the mechanism, for ail the EMU countries. First, regarding
the indicator of the occurrence of the shock, it would be convenient to hâve
available a higher degree of harmonization in the définition of unemploy-
ment rates, or, alternatively, homogeneous monthly data on employment.
In addition, a higher degree of fiscal harmonization for VAT (or the alterna
tive tax figure to build the fund from), and the availability of homogeneous
monthly data for tax collections would be also useful. Finally, it could be
more appropriate, provided that data are available, designing the mecha
nism by looking at the régional économies level rather than national states',
both for the définition of the shock and the distribution of the fund.Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Di'az-Roldén . 95
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